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Abstract
Adversarial training is an effective defense method to
protect classification models against adversarial attacks.
However, one limitation of this approach is that it can
require orders of magnitude additional training time due
to high cost of generating strong adversarial examples
during training. In this paper, we first show that there
is high transferability between models from neighboring
epochs in the same training process, i.e., adversarial ex-
amples from one epoch continue to be adversarial in sub-
sequent epochs. Leveraging this property, we propose a
novel method, Adversarial Training with Transferable Ad-
versarial Examples (ATTA), that can enhance the robust-
ness of trained models and greatly improve the training ef-
ficiency by accumulating adversarial perturbations through
epochs. Compared to state-of-the-art adversarial train-
ing methods, ATTA enhances adversarial accuracy by up
to 7.2% on CIFAR10 and requires 12 ∼ 14× less train-
ing time on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets with compara-
ble model robustness. Our code is publicized at https:
//github.com/hzzheng93/ATTA .
1. Introduction
State-of-the-art deep learning models for computer vi-
sion tasks have been found to be vulnerable to adversarial
examples [31]. Even a small perturbation on the image can
fool a well-trained model. Recent works [8, 29, 30] also
show that adversarial examples can be physically realized,
which can lead to serious safety issues. Design of robust
models, which correctly classifies adversarial examples, is
an active research area [5, 11, 17, 25, 35], with adversarial
training [21] being one of the most effective methods. It
formulates training as a game between adversarial attacks
and the model: the stronger the adversarial examples gener-
ated to train the model are, the more robust the model is.
To generate strong adversarial examples, iterative at-
tacks [16], which use multiple attack iterations to generate
adversarial examples, are widely adopted in various adver-
sarial training methods [4,21,32,39]. Since adversarial per-
turbations are usually bounded by a constrained space S and
attack perturbations outside S need to be projected back to
S, k-step projected gradient descent method [16,21] (PGD-
k) has been widely adopted to generate adversarial exam-
ples. Typically, using more attack iterations (higher value
of k) produces stronger adversarial examples [21]. How-
ever, each attack iteration needs to compute the gradient on
the input, which causes a large computational overhead. As
shown in Table 1, the training time of adversarial training
can be close to 100 times larger than natural training.
Recent works [20, 23, 24] show that adversarial exam-
ples can be transferred between models: adversarial exam-
ples generated for one model can still stay adversarial to an-
other model. The key insight in our work, which we experi-
mentally verified, is that, because of high transferability be-
tween models (i.e., checkpoints) from neighboring training
epochs, attack strength can be accumulated across epochs
by repeatedly reusing the adversarial perturbation from the
previous epoch.
We take advantage of this insight in coming up with a
novel adversarial training method called ATTA (Adversarial
Training with Transferable Adversarial examples) that can
be significantly faster than state-of-the-art methods while
achieving similar model robustness. In traditional adversar-
ial training, when a new epoch begins, the attack algorithm
generates adversarial examples from the original input im-
ages, which ignores the fact that these perturbations can be
reused effectively. In contrast, we show that it can be ad-
vantageous to reuse these adversarial perturbations through
epochs. Even using only one attack iteration to generate
adversarial examples, ATTA-1 can still achieve comparable
robustness with respect to traditional PGD-40.
We apply our technique on Madry’s Adversarial Train-
ing method (MAT) [21] and TRADES [39] and evaluate the
performance on both MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset. Com-
pared with traditional PGD attack, our method improves
training efficiency by up to 12.2× (14.1×) on MNIST (CI-
FAR10) with comparable model robustness. Trained with
ATTA, the adversarial accuracy of MAT can be improved
by up to 7.2%. Noticeably, for MNIST, with one attack
iteration, our method can achieve 96.31% adversarial accu-
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racy within 5 minutes (compared to 65 minutes with MAT
). For CIFAR10, compared to MAT whose training time is
more than one day, our method achieves comparable adver-
sarial accuracy in about 2 hours (compared to 33 hours with
MAT). We also verify that our method is practical for large
dataset: we evaluate our method with ImageNet, which can
achieve comparative robustness within 97 hours with just
one 2080 TI GPU. We also compare our method with two
fast adversarial training methods, YOPO [37] and Free [27].
Evaluation results show that our method is both more effec-
tive and efficient than these two methods.
Contribution. To the best of our knowledge, our work
is the first to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of ad-
versarial training by taking advantage of high transferabil-
ity between models from different epochs. In summary, we
make the following contributions:
• We are the first to reveal the high transferability be-
tween models of neighboring epochs in adversarial
training. With this property, we verify that the attack
strength can be accumulated across epochs by reusing
adversarial perturbations from the previous epoch.
• We propose a novel method (ATTA) for iterative at-
tack based adversarial training with the objectives of
both efficiency and effectiveness. It can generate the
similar (or even stronger) adversarial examples with
much fewer attack iterations via accumulating adver-
sarial perturbations through epochs.
• Evaluation result shows that, with comparable model
robustness, ATTA is 12.2× (14.1×) faster than tra-
ditional adversarial methods on MNIST (CIFAR10).
ATTA can also enhance model adversarial accuracy by
up to 7.2% for MAT on CIFAR10.
2. Adversarial training and transferability
In this section, we introduce relevant background on ad-
versarial training and transferability of adversarial exam-
ples. We also discuss the trade-off between training time
and model robustness.
2.1. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training is an effective defense method to
train robust models against adversarial attacks. By using
adversarial attacks as a data augmentation method, a model
trained with adversarial examples achieves considerable ro-
bustness. Recently, lots of works [2,12,14,21,26,38,39] fo-
cus on analyzing and improving adversarial machine learn-
ing. Madry et al. [21] first formulate adversarial training as
a min-max optimization problem:
min
f∈H
E(x,y)∼D[max
δ∈S
L(f(x+ δ), y)] (1)
where H is the hypothesis space, D is the distribution of
the training dataset, L is a loss function, and S is the al-
lowed perturbation space that is usually selected as an L-p
norm ball around x. The basic strategy in adversarial train-
ing is, given a original image x, to find a perturbed image
x+ δ that maximizes the loss with respect to correct classi-
fication. The model is then trained on generated adversarial
examples. In this work, We consider adversarial examples
with a high loss to have high attack strength.
PGD-k attack based adversarial training: Unfortu-
nately, solving the inner maximization problem is hard. It-
erative attack [16] is commonly used to generate strong ad-
versarial examples as an approximate solution for the inner
maximization problem of Equation 1. Since adversarial per-
turbations are usually bounded by the allowed perturbation
space S, PGD-k (k-step projected gradient descent [16]) is
adopted to conduct iterative attack [21, 27, 37, 39]. PGD-k
adversarial attack is the multi-step projected gradient de-
scent on a negative loss function:
xt+1 = Πx+S(xt + α sgn(∆xtL(θ, xt, y)))
In the above, xt is the adversarial example in the t-th
attack iteration, α is the attack step size, and Π is the pro-
jection function to project adversarial examples back to the
allowed perturbation space S.
With a higher value of k (more attack iterations), PGD-
k can generate adversarial examples with higher loss [21].
However, there is a trade-off between training time and
model robustness in adversarial training. On one hand,
since each attack iteration needs to calculate the gradient for
the input, using more attack iterations requires more time to
generate adversarial examples, thus causing a large com-
putational overhead for adversarial training. As shown in
Table 1, compared to natural training, adversarial training
may need close to 100x more training time until the model
converges. Most of the training time is consumed in gener-
ating adversarial examples (attack time). On the other hand,
reducing the number of attack iterations k can reduce the
training time, but that negatively impacts robustness of the
trained model (Table 2).
Dataset NaturalTraining
Adversarial training
Training Attack Total
MNIST 39.7 sec 210 sec 3723 sec 3933 sec
CIAFR10 55min 214 min 1813 min 2027 min
Table 1: Training time of natural training and adversarial
training. Attack column shows the time consumed in adver-
sarial example generation.
Defense PGD-1 PGD-3 PGD-5 PGD-10
Nat. Acc. 93.18% 89.95% 85.24% 87.49%
Adv. Acc. 22.3% 41.38% 43.55% 47.07%
Time (min) 435 785 1140 2027
Table 2: The relation between the number of attack iter-
ations and adversarial accuracy against PGD-20 attack on
CIFAR10 dataset.
2.2. Transferability of Adversarial Examples.
Szegedy et al. [31] show that adversarial examples gen-
erated for one model can stay adversarial for other mod-
els. This property is named as transferability. This prop-
erty is usually leveraged to perform a black-box attack
[19, 20, 23, 24]. To attack a targeted model ft, the attacker
generates transferable adversarial examples from the source
model fs. The higher the transferability between fs and ft
is, the higher the success rate the attack has.
Substitute model training is a commonly used method
to train a source model fs. Rather than the benchmark la-
bel y, fs is trained with ft(x) which is the prediction result
of the targeted model [24] to achieve a higher black-box at-
tack success rate. While our work does not use black-box
attacks, we do rely on a similar intuition as behind substitute
model training, namely, two models with similar behavior
and decision boundaries are likely to have higher transfer-
ability between each other. We use this intuition to show
high transferability between models from neighboring train-
ing epochs, as discussed in the next section.
3. Attack strength accumulation
In this section, we first conduct a study and find that
models from neighboring epochs show very high transfer-
ability and are naturally good substitute models to each
other. Based on this observation, we design an accumulative
PGD-k attack that accumulates attack strength by reusing
adversarial perturbations from one epoch to the next. Com-
pared to traditional PGD-k attack, accumulative PGD-k at-
tack achieves much higher attack strength with fewer num-
ber of attack iterations in each epoch.
3.1. High transferability between epochs
Transferability between models in different training
epochs of the same training program has not been studied.
Because fluctuations of model parameters between different
epochs are very small, we think that they are likely to have
similar behavior and similar decision boundaries, which
should lead to high transferability between these models.
To evaluate the transferability between models from
training epochs, we adversarially train a model T as the tar-
geted model, while saving intermediate models at the end of
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Figure 1: Error rate transferability and loss transferability
with the different source models.
three immediately prior epochs as T1, T2, and T3, with T3
being the model from the epoch immediately prior to T . We
measure the transferability of adversarial examples of each
of Ti with T . For comparison, we also train three additional
models S1, S2, and S3 that are trained by exactly the same
training method as T but with different random seeds. And
we measure the transferability between each of Si and T .
To measure transferability from the source model to the
targeted model, we use two metrics. The first metric is er-
ror rate transferability used in [1, 23], which is the ratio of
the number of adversarial examples misclassified by source
model to that of the targeted model. The other metric is loss
transferability, which is the ratio of the loss value caused by
adversarial examples on the source model to the loss value
caused by the same examples on the targeted model.
We conduct experiments on both MNIST and CIFAR10
dataset, and the results are shown on Figure 1. We find
that, compared to the baseline models Si, the models Ti
from neighboring epochs of T have higher transferability
for both transferability metrics (the transferability metrics
for all models Ti are larger than 0.93). This provides strong
empirical evidence that adversarial examples generated in
one epoch still retain some strength in subsequent epochs.
Inspired by the above result, we state the following hy-
pothesis. Hypothesis: Repeatedly reusing perturbations
from the previous epoch can accumulate attack strength
epoch by epoch. Compared to current methods that iter-
ate from original images in each epoch, this can allow us to
use few attack iterations to generate the same strong adver-
sarial examples.
3.2. Accumulative PGD-k attack
To validate the aforementioned hypothesis, we design
an accumulative PGD-k attack. As shown in Figure 2b,
we longitudinally connect models in each epoch by directly
reusing the attack perturbation of the previous epoch. Ac-
cumulative PGD-k attack Figure 2b generates adversarial
examples for fn−m+1 first. Then, for the following epochs,
the attack is performed based on the accumulated perturba-
tions from previous epochs.
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Figure 2: The traditional PGD-k attack (a) and the accu-
mulative PGD-k attack through m epochs (b). The PGD-k
attack is performed on the model in the red rectangle to get
adversarial examples.
To compare the attack strength of two attacks, we
use Madry’s method [21] to adversarially train two mod-
els on MNIST and CIFAR10 and evaluate the loss value
L(fn(x∗n), y) of adversarial examples generated by two at-
tacks. Figure 3 summarises the evaluation result. We can
find that, with more epochs m involved in the attack, accu-
mulative PGD-k attack can achieve a higher loss value with
the same number of attack iterations k.
Especially, when adversarial examples are transferred
through a large number of epochs, even accumulative PGD-
1 attack can cause high attack loss. For MNIST, accumula-
tive PGD-1 attack can achieve the same attack loss as tradi-
tional PGD-35 attack when m = 40. For CIFAR10, accu-
mulative PGD-1 attack can achieve the same attack loss as
traditional PGD-12 attack when m = 10.
This result indicates that, with high transferability be-
tween epochs, adversarial perturbations can be reused ef-
fectively, which allows us to use fewer attack iterations to
generate the same or stronger adversarial examples. Reuse
of perturbations across epochs can help us reduce the num-
ber of attack iterations k in PGD-k, leading to more efficient
adversarial training. Next section describes our proposed
algorithm, ATTA (Adversarial Training with Transferable
Adversarial examples), based on this property.
(a) MNIST
(b) CIFAR10
Figure 3: Given the number of epochs m, the relationship
between the number of attack iterations k and the attack
loss. m = 1 stands for the traditional PGD-k attack.
4. Adversarial training with transferable ad-
versarial examples
The discussion on transferability in Section 3 suggests
that adversarial examples can retain attack strength in sub-
sequent training epochs. The results of accumulative attack
in Section 3 suggest that stronger adversarial examples can
be generated by accumulating attack strength. This property
inspires us to link adversarial examples between adjacent
epochs as shown in Figure 4. Unlike starting from a natural
image x to generate an adversarial example in each epoch as
shown in Figure 4(a), we start from a previously saved ad-
versarial example xi∗ from the previous epoch to generate
an adversarial example (Figure 4(b)). To improve the trans-
ferability between epochs, we use a connection function C
to link adversarial examples, which transforms x∗i to a start
point xi+1 for the next epoch. During the training, with
repeatedly reusing adversarial example between epochs, at-
tack strength can be accumulated epoch by epoch:
x∗i+1 = A(fi+1, x, y, C(x∗i ))
where A is the attack algorithm, C is a connection function
(described in the next section). fi is the model in the i-th
epoch, x∗i is the adversarial examples generated in the i-th
epoch and x, y are natural image and benchmark label 1.
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Figure 4: Traditional adversarial training (PGD-k) (a) and
ATTA-k (b). C is the connection function which improves
the transferability between epochs.
As shown in the previous section, adversarial examples
can achieve high attack strength as they are transferred
across epochs via the above linking process, rather than
starting from natural images. This, in turn, should allow
us to train a more robust model with fewer attack iterations.
4.1. Connection function design
Designing connection function can help us overcome
two challenges that we encountered in achieving high trans-
ferability of adversarial examples from one epoch to the
next:
1. Data augmentation problem: Data augmentation is a
commonly used technique to improve the performance
of deep learning. It applies randomly transformation
on original images so that models can be trained with
various images in different epochs. This difference can
cause a mismatch of images between epochs. Since the
perturbation is calculated with the gradient of image,
if we directly reuse the perturbation, the mismatch be-
tween reused perturbation and new augmented image
can cause a decrease in attack strength. Simply remov-
ing data augmentation also hurts the robustness. We
experimentally show this negative influence of these
two alternatives in Section 5.3.
2. Drastic model parameter change problem: As dis-
cussed in Section 3, similar parameters between mod-
els tends to cause a similar decision boundary and thus
high transferability. Unfortunately, model parameters
tend to change drastically at the early stages of train-
ing. Thus, adversarial perturbations in early epochs
tend to be useless for subsequent epochs.
1Note that the x∗i+1 is still bounded by the natural image x, rather than
C(x∗i ).
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Figure 5: The workflow of inversed data augmentation.
Overcoming challenges: Inverse data augmentation.
To address the first issue, we propose a technique called
inverse data augmentation so that adversarial examples re-
tain a high transferability between training epochs despite
data augmentation. Figure 5 shows the workflow with in-
verse data augmentation. Some transformations (like crop-
ping and rotation) pad augmented images with background
pixels. To transfer a perturbation on background pixels, our
method transfers the padded image xi rather than standard
images so that the background pixels used by data augmen-
tation can be covered by these paddings.
After the adversarial perturbation of augmented image
is generated, we can perform the inverse transformation2
T−1(·) to calculate the inversed perturbation T−1(∆i) on
the padded image xi. By adding T−1(∆i) to xi, we can
store and transfer all perturbation information in xi+1 to
next epoch. (Note that, when we perform the adversarial
attack on the augmented image xi,aug , the perturbation is
still bounded by the natural image rather than xi,aug .)
Periodically reset perturbation. To solve the second
issue, we propose a straightforward but effective solution:
our method resets the perturbation and lets adversarial per-
turbations be accumulated from the beginning periodically,
which mitigates the impact caused by early perturbations.
4.2. Attack Loss
Various attack loss functions are used in different adver-
sarial training algorithms. For example, TRADES [39] uses
robustness loss (Equation 2) as the loss to generate the ad-
versarial examples.
L(f(x∗), f(x)) (2)
2In adversarial training, most data augmentation methods used are lin-
ear transformations which are easy to be inversed.
where L is the loss function, f is the model and x, x∗ are
natural and adversarial example respectively. This loss rep-
resents how much the adversarial example diverges from the
natural image. Zhang et al. [39] shows that this loss has a
better performance in the TRADES algorithm.
In our method, we use the following loss function:
L(f(x∗), y) (3)
It represents how much the adversarial examples diverges
to the benchmark label.
The objection (f(x)) of Equation 2 for adversarial attack
varies across epochs, which may weaken the transferability
between epochs. Equation 3 applies a fixed objection (y),
which doesn’t have this concern. In addition, Equation 3
has a smaller computational graph, which can reduce com-
putational overhead during training.
The overall training method is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Training with Transferable Ad-
versarial Examples (ATTA)
1: Input: Padded training dataset Dnat, model fθ, at-
tack algorithm A, perturbation bound , the number of
epochs to reset perturbation reset
2: Initialize θ
3: Initialize D by cloning Dnat
4: for epoch = 1 · · ·N do
5: for xnat, y in Dnat and corresponding x ∈ D do
6: if epoch % reset = 0 then
7: β ← a small random perturbation
8: x← xnat + β
9: end if
10: Store the transformation Taug for the inverse
augmentation:
11: xaug, xnat,aug, Taug ← data aug(x, xadv)
12: x∗ ← A(fθ, xnat,aug, y, xaug, )
13: θ ← θ −∇fθ ∂L(fθ,x
∗,y)
∂θ
14: x← inverse aug(x, x∗, Taug)
15: end for
16: end for
5. Evaluation
In this section, we integrate ATTA with two popular ad-
versarial training methods: Madry’s Adversarial Training
(MAT) [21] and TRADES [39]. By evaluating the training
time and robustness, we show that ATTA can provide a bet-
ter trade-off than other adversarial training methods. To un-
derstand the contribution of each component to robustness,
we conduct an ablation study.
5.1. Setup
Following the literature [21, 37, 39], we use both
MNIST [17] and CIFAR10 dataset [15] to evaluate ATTA.
For the MNIST dataset, the model has four convolu-
tional layers followed by three full-connected layers which
is same architecture as used in [21,39]. The adversarial per-
turbation is bounded by l∞ ball with size  = 0.3.
For the CIFAR10 dataset, we use the wide residual net-
work WRN-34-10 [36] which is same as [21, 39]. The per-
turbation is bounded by l∞ ball with size  = 0.031.
5.2. Efficiency and effectiveness of ATTA
In this part, we evaluate the training efficiency and the
robustness of ATTA, comparing it to state-of-the-art adver-
sarial training algorithms. To better verify effectiveness of
ATTA, we also evaluate ATTA under various attacks.
5.2.1 Training efficiency
We select four state-of-the-art adversarial training methods
as baselines: MAT [21], TRADES [39], YOPO [37] and
Free [27]. For MNIST, the model trained with ATTA can
achieve a comparable robustness with up to 12.2 times train-
ing efficiency and, for CIFAR10, our method can achieve a
comparable robustness with up to 14.1 times training effi-
ciency. Compared to MAT trained with PGD, our method
improve the accuracy up to 7.2% with 3.7 times training
efficiency.
Defense
Attack
Natural PGD-40
Time
(sec)
MAT
PGD-1 99.52% 15.82% 226
PGD-40 99.37% 96.21% 3933
YOPO-5-10 99.15% 93.69% 789
ATTA-1 99.45% 96.31% 297
ATTA-40 99.23% 97.28% 4650
TRADES
PGD-1 99.41% 39.53% 583
PGD-40 98.89% 96.54% 6544
ATTA-1 99.03% 96.10% 460
ATTA-40 98.21% 96.03% 4660
Table 3: The result of different attacks on MNIST dataset.
MNIST. The experiment results of MNIST are sum-
marised in Table 3. For MAT, to achieve comparable ro-
bustness, ATTA is about 12.2 times faster than the tradi-
tional PGD training method. Even with one attack itera-
tion, model trained with ATTA-1 achieves 96.31% adver-
sarial accuracy within 297 seconds. For TRADES, we get
a similar result. With one attack iteration, ATTA-1 achieves
96.1% adversarial accuracy within 460 seconds, which is
about 13 times faster than TRADES(PGD-40). Compared
to another fast adversarial training method YOPO, ATTA-
1 is about 2.7 times faster and achieves higher robustness
(96.1% versus YOPO’s 93.69%).
Defense
Attack
Natural PGD-20
Time
(min)
MAT
PGD-1 93.18% 22.3% 435
PGD-3 89.95% 41.38% 785
PGD-10 87.49% 47.07% 2027
Free(m = 8) 85.54% 47.68% 640
YOPO-5-3 86.43% 48.24% 335
ATTA-1 85.71% 50.96% 134
ATTA-3 85.44% 52.56% 267
ATTA-10 83.80% 54.33% 690
TRADES
PGD-1 93.58% 35.52% 592
PGD-3 88.52% 54.20% 861
PGD-10 84.13% 56.6% 2028
YOPO-3-4 3 87.82% 46.13% -
ATTA-1 85.04% 54.50% 199
ATTA-3 84.23% 56.36% 320
ATTA-10 83.67% 57.34% 752
Table 4: The result of different attacks on CIFAR10 dataset.
CIFAR10. We summarise the experiment results of CI-
FAR10 in Table 4. For MAT, compared to PGD-10, ATTA-
1 achieves 3.89% higher adversarial accuracy with about
15.1 times training efficiency, and ATTA-10 improves ad-
versarial accuracy by 7.26% with 2.9 times training effi-
ciency when the model is trained with 10 attack iterations.
For TRADES, ATTA-3 achieves comparable adversarial ac-
curacy to PGD-10 with 5.3 times faster training efficiency.
By comparing the experiment results with YOPO and Free,
for MAT, our method is 3.78 (1.5) times faster than Free
(YOPO) with 3.28% (2.72%) better adversarial accuracy.
To better understand the performance of ATTA, we
present the trade-off between training time and robustness
of different methods in Figure 6. We find that our method
(indicated by the solid markers in the left-top corner) gives
a better trade-off on efficiency and effectiveness on adver-
sarial training.
3The author-implemented YOPO-3-4 can’t converge in our experiment.
We pick the accuracy data from YOPO paper.
Figure 6: The scatter plot presents adversarial accuracy
against PGD-20 attack and training time of different adver-
sarial training methods on CIFAR10.
5.2.2 Defense under other attacks
To verify the robustness of our method, we evaluate models
in the previous section with other attacks: PGD-100 [16],
FGSM [9], CW-20 [3].
Defense PGD100 FGSM CW20
MNIST
M-PGD-40 94.69% 97.37% 99.06%
M-ATTA-40 96.85% 98.55% 98.02%
CIFAR10
M-PGD-10 46.77% 63.5% 56.7%
M-ATTA-10 52.6% 63.49% 75.37%
T-PGD-10 55.36% 63.02% 79.4%
T-ATTA-10 56.39% 64.1% 82.01%
Table 5: The robustness comparison between ATTA and
PGD under other attacks. The first ‘M’ and ‘T’ stand for
MAT and TRADES, respectively.
As shown in Table 5, models trained with ATTA are still
robust to other attacks. Compared to baselines, our method
still achieves a comparable or better robustness under other
attacks. We find that, although ATTA-40 has a similar ro-
bustness to PGD-40 under PGD-20 attack, with a stronger
attack (e.g. PGD-100), ATTA-40 shows a better robustness
.
5.2.3 ATTA with ImageNet
Table 6 shows the results for training an ImageNet Classi-
fier [6] with ATTA for l∞( = 2/255) attack with the loss
used in MAT. We also show previously reported results of
Free (m = 4) from [27]. Shafahi et al. [27] report requiring
about 50 hours with four P100s to adversarially train their
model. ATTA required 97 hours with one 2080Ti.
Defense Natural PGD10 PGD50 PGD100
Free(m = 4) 64.44% 43.52% 43.39% 43.40%
ATTA-2 60.70% 44.57% 43.57% 43.51%
Table 6: Evaluation of ATTA on ImageNet
5.3. Ablation study
To study the contribution of each component to robust-
ness, we do an ablation study on inverse data augmentation
and different attack loss functions.
Inverse data augmentation. To study the robustness
gain of inverse data augmentation(i.d.a.), we use ATTA-
1 to adversarially train models by reusing the adversarial
perturbation directly. As shown in Table 7, for both MAT
(ATTA-1) and TRADES (ATTA-1), models trained with in-
verse data augmentation achieve about 6% higher accuracy,
which means that inverse data augmentation does help im-
prove the transferability between training epochs. As dis-
cussed in 4.1, another alternative is to remove data augmen-
tation. However, Table 7 shows that removal of data aug-
mentation hurts both natural accuracy and robustness.
Defense
Attack
Natural PGD-20
MAT(w/o d.a., w/o i.d.a.) 82.53% 41.64%
MAT(w/ d.a., w/o i.d.a.) 91.65% 42.55%
MAT(w/ d.a., w/ i.d.a.) 85.71% 50.96%
TRADES(w/o d.a., w/o i.d.a.) 81.87% 41.65%
TRADES(w/ d.a., w/o i.d.a.) 90.46% 48.38%
TRADES(w/ d.a., w/ i.d.a.) 85.04% 54.50%
Table 7: The accuracy under PGD attack of models trained
by ATTA-1 with or without d.a.(data augmentation) and
i.d.a. (inverse data augmentation).
Attack loss. Zhang et al. [39] show that, for TRADES,
using Equation 2 leads to a better robustness. However, in
this attack loss, we noticed that both inputs to the loss func-
tion L are related to the model f . Since the model f is
updated every epoch, compared to Equation 3 whose y is
fixed, the instability of f(x∗) and f(x) may have a larger
influence on transferability. To analyze the performance dif-
ference between these two attack losses in ATTA, we train
two TRADES(ATTA-1) models with different attack losses.
In Table 9, we find that Equation 3 leads to 2.48% higher ac-
curacy against PGD-20 attack. This result suggests that the
higher stability of Equation 3 helps ATTA increase transfer-
ability between training epochs.
Defense
Attack
Natural PGD-20
TRADES loss 85.95% 52.08%
MAT loss 85.04% 54.50%
Table 8: The accuracy under PGD attack of models trained
by TRADES(ATTA-1) with MAT loss and TRADES loss.
6. Related work
Several works [2,4,12,18,21,27,28,32,34,37] focus on
enhancing either the efficiency or effectiveness of the ad-
versarial training that was first proposed in [16]. We high-
light most relevant work here. YOPO [37]. TRADES [39]
improves the robustness of an adversarially trained model
by adding a robustness regularizer in the loss function.
BAT [34] uses perturbed labels (besides perturbed images)
to generate strong attacks with fewer iterations than Madry
et al. [21]. ATTA does not perturb labels and is based on a
completely different insight of transferability.
Free [27] speeds up adversarial training by recycling gra-
dients calculated during training when generating adversar-
ial examples. In contrast, ATTA speedups adversarial train-
ing with a completely different insight based on transfer-
ability. While recycling gradients, Free does reuse pertur-
bations through iterations on the top of the same batch of
images (inner-batch). In contrast, ATTA reuses perturba-
tions across epochs (inter-epoch). Inter-epoch reuse is a
non-trivial problem involving new challenges discussed in
Section 4.1, requiring use of connection functions to over-
come them. Free did not discuss transferability, but our
analysis of transferability potentially provides an alterna-
tive way of understanding Free. For many training scenar-
ios, ATTA both outperforms existing techniques as well as
achieves better robustness.
7. Conclusion
ATTA is a new method for iterative attack based adver-
sarial training that significantly speeds up training time and
improves model robustness. The key insight behind ATTA
is high transferability between models from neighboring
epochs, which is firstly revealed in this paper. Based on this
property, the attack strength in ATTA can be accumulated
across epochs by repeatedly reusing adversarial perturba-
tions from the previous epoch. This allows ATTA to gen-
erate the same (or even stronger) adversarial examples with
fewer attack iterations. We evaluate ATTA and compare it
with state-of-the-art adversarial training methods. It greatly
shortens the training time with comparable or even better
model robustness. More importantly, ATTA is a generic
method and can be applied to enhance the performance of
other iterative attack based adversarial training methods.
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A. Overview
This supplementary material provides details on our ex-
periment and additional evaluation results. In Section B,
we introduce the detailed setup of our experiment. In
Section C, we compare adversarial examples generated by
ATTA and PGD and show that, even with one attack iter-
ation, ATTA-1 can generate similar perturbations to PGD-
40 (PGD-10) on MNIST (CIFAR10). We also provide the
complete evaluation results in Section C.2.
B. Experiment setup
We provide additional details on the implementation,
model architecture, and hyper-parameters used in this work.
MNIST. We use the same model architecture used in
[21, 37, 39], which has four convolutional layers followed
by three fully-connected layers. The adversarial examples
used to train the model are bounded by l∞ ball with size
 = 0.3 and the step size for each attack iteration is 0.01.
We do not apply any data augmentation (and inverse data
augmentation) on MNIST and set the epoch period to reset
perturbation as infinity which means that perturbations are
not reset during the training. The model is trained for 60
epochs with an initial 0.1 learning rate and a 0.01 learning
rate after 55 epochs, which is the same as [37]. To eval-
uate the model robustness, we perform the PGD [16], M-
PGD [7] and CW [3] attack with a 0.01 step size and set
decay factor as 1 for M-PGD (momentum PGD).
CIFAR10. Following other works [21, 27, 37, 39], we
use Wide-Resnet-34-10 [36] as the model architecture. The
adversarial examples used to train the model are bounded
by l∞ ball with size  = 0.031. For ATTA-1, 2, 3, we use
0.015, 0.01, 0.01 as the step size, respectively. For ATTA-
k (k > 3), we use 0.007 as the step size. The data aug-
mentation used is a random flip and 4-pixel padding crop,
which is same with other works [21, 27, 37, 39]. We set the
epoch period to reset perturbation as 10 epochs. Following
YOPO [37], the model is trained for 40 epochs with an ini-
tial 0.1 learning rate, a 0.01 learning rate after 30 epochs,
and a 0.001 learning rate after 35 epochs. To evaluate the
model robustness, we perform the PGD, M-PGD and CW
attack with a 0.003 step size and set decay factor as 1 for
M-PGD (momentum PGD).
ImageNet. We use Resnet-50 [10] as the model architec-
ture. The adversarial examples used to train the model are
bounded by l∞ ball with size  = 2/255, and we use we use
1/255 as the step size. The model is trained for 20 epochs
with a piece-wise learning rate which is 0.4 when epoch is
less than 6, 0.04 when epoch is between 6 and 11, 0.004
when epoch is between 12 and 14, 0.0004 when epoch is
larger than 14.
For the baseline, we use the author implementation of
MAT4 [21], TRADES5 [39], YOPO6 [39], and Free7 [27]
with the hyper-parameters recommended in their works,
and we select 1/λ as 6 for TRADES (both ATTA and PGD).
In Section 3, which analyzes the transferability between
training epochs, we use MAT with PGD-10 to train models
and PGD-20 to calculate loss value and error rate.
Each experiment is taken on one idle NVIDIA GeForce
RTX 2080 Ti GPU. Except PGD attack, we implement other
attacks with Adversarial Robustness Toolbox [22].
C. Experiment details
C.1. Qualitative study on training images
To compare the quality of adversarial examples gener-
ated by PGD and ATTA, we visualize some adversarial ex-
amples generated by both methods. For MNIST, we choose
the model checkpoint trained by MAT-ATTA-1 at epoch 40.
For CIFAR10, we choose the model checkpoint trained by
MAT-ATTA-1 at epoch 30. Figure 7 shows the adversarial
examples and perturbations used to train the model (ATTA-
1) and genereated by PGD-40 (PGD-10) attack on MNIST
(CIFAR10) model in each class. To better visualize the per-
turbation, we re-scale the perturbation by calculating 2xp
(where xp is the perturbation and  is the L∞ bound of ad-
versarial attack). This shifts the L∞ ball to the scale of
[0, 1].
We find that, although ATTA-1 just performs one attack
iteration in each epoch, it generates similar perturbations
to PGD-40 (PGD-10) in MNIST (CIFAR10). The effect of
inverse data augmentation is shown in Figure 7b. There
are some perturbations on the padded pixels in the third
row (ATTA-1), but perturbations just generated by PGD-10
(shown in fifth row) just appear on cropped pixels.
C.2. Complete evaluation results
We put the complete evaluation result in this section as a
supplement to Section 5.2.
We evaluate defense methods under additional attacks
and the evaluation results are shown in Table 10 and Ta-
ble 11. Similar to the conclusion stated in Section 5.2, com-
pared to other methods, ATTA achieves comparable robust-
ness with much less training time, which shows a better
trade-off on training efficiency and robustness. With the
same number of attack iterations, ATTA needs less time to
4 https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge
https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge
5https://github.com/yaodongyu/TRADES
6https://github.com/a1600012888/
YOPO-You-Only-Propagate-Once
7https://github.com/ashafahi/free_adv_train
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Figure 7: Visualization of natural images, adversarial ex-
amples and corresponding perturbations in each class for
MNIST and CIFAR10. The first row in (a) and (b) shows
the natural images. The second and third rows show the ad-
versarial examples and perturbations generated by ATTA-
1. The fourth and fifth rows show the adversarial examples
and perturbations generated by PGD-40 in (a) and PGD-10
in (b).
train the model. As mentioned in Section 3.2, with the ac-
cumulation of adversarial perturbations, ATTA can use the
same number of attack iterations to achieve a higher attack
strength, which helps the model converge faster.
Also, we test our models with stronger attacks which
have a different attack size and multipule random starts. We
evaluate ATTA-1 model trained with both MAT loss and
TRADES loss against PGD-20 attack with an /4 step-size
and 20 independent random starts.
Defense
Attack
/4 step-size 20 random starts
MAT-ATTA-1 49.56% 48.48%
TRADES-ATTA-1 53.71% 52.90%
Table 9: Accuracy against PGD-20 attack with different set-
tings.
D. Discussion
Natural accuracy v.s. Adversarial accuracy. In this
paper, we find that higher adversarial accuracy can lower
natural accuracy. This trade-off has been observed and ex-
plained in [33, 39]. A recent work [13] points out that fea-
tures used by naturally trained models are highly-predictive
but not robust and adversarially trained models tend to use
robust features rather than highly-predictive features, which
may cause this trade-off. Table 11 also shows that, when
models are trained with stronger attacks (more attack itera-
tions), the models tend to have higher adversarial accuracy
but lower natural accuracy.
Transferability between training epochs. Adversar-
ial attacks augment the training data to improve the model
robustness. Our work points out that, unlike images aug-
mented by traditional data augmentation methods that are
independent between epochs, adversarial examples gener-
ated by adversarial attacks show high relevance transferabil-
ity between epochs. We hope this finding can inspire other
researchers to enhance adversarial training from a new per-
spective (e.g., improving transferability between epochs).
Inter-epoch reuse in ATTA v.s. inner-batch reuse
in Free. Both ATTA and Free reuse perturbations dur-
ing training. The difference between the two methods is
how to reuse perturbations (Fig. 8). Free reuses perturba-
tions through iterations on the top of the same batch of im-
ages (inner-batch), but ATTA reuses perturbations across
epochs (inter-epoch), which is complementary to inner-
batch reuse. Inter-epoch reuse is a non-trivial problem in-
volving new challenges discussed in Section 4.1. The no-
tion of connection function, which is a crucial feature of
ATTA to overcome these challenges, which only applies
when exploiting transferability across epochs, does not ex-
ist in Free. We found that ATTA can outperform Free, even
without any inner-batch reuse and Free’s warm start be-
tween different batches (In Free, when a new batch comes,
the perturbations of the previous batch are directly used as
a warm start, but the mismatch between images and pertur-
bations could be resulting in reduced effectiveness.).
Epoch 3
Epoch 3 + 1
Batch 1 Batch k
…
(a) Inter-epoch reuse in ATTA
Epoch 3
Epoch 3 + 1
Batch 1 Batch k
…
(b) Inner-batch reuse in Free
Training iterationReuseConnection function
… ……
… …
…
Training Batch
Figure 8: Comparison on reuse between Free and ATTA.
Defense
Attack
Natural PGD-40 PGD-100 M-PGD-40 FGSM CW-20
Time
(sec)
MAT
PGD-1 99.52% 15.82% 4.17% 13.99% 81.84% 98.99% 226
PGD-10 99.52% 34.92% 16.90% 36.88% 94.32% 99.38% 1649
PGD-40 99.37% 96.21% 94.69% 96.79% 97.37% 99.06% 3933
YOPO-5-10 99.15% 93.69% 87.93% 99.04% 94.51% 99.03% 789
ATTA-1 99.45% 96.31% 95.11% 96.15% 98.31% 99.14% 297
ATTA-10 99.41% 97.36% 96.75% 97.45% 98.37% 99.3% 1687
ATTA-40 99.23% 97.28% 96.85% 97.51% 98.55% 98.02% 4650
TRADES
PGD-1 99.41% 39.53% 31.28% 36.42% 71.01% 99.17% 583
PGD-10 99.37% 50.06% 25.71% 50.59% 95.12% 99.24% 1823
PGD-40 98.89% 96.54% 95.54% 96.79% 97.83% 98.87% 6544
ATTA-1 99.03% 96.10% 94.24% 95.86% 98.38% 98.93% 460
ATTA-10 98.83% 96.86% 96.34% 96.90% 98.11% 98.68% 1686
ATTA-40 98.21% 96.03% 96.33% 96.80% 97.85% 98.32% 4660
Table 10: The result of various attacks on MNIST dataset.
Defense
Attack
Natural PGD-20 PGD-100 M-PGD-20 FGSM CW-20
Time
(min)
MAT
PGD-1 93.18% 22.3% 21.63% 23.51% 49.88% 31% 435
PGD-2 91.33% 35.16% 34.46% 38.61% 55.84% 44.12% 600
PGD-3 89.95% 41.38% 40.59% 42.17% 59.82% 50.94% 785
PGD-10 87.49% 47.07% 46.77% 47.95% 63.5% 56.7% 2027
Free(m = 8) 85.54% 47.68% 47.22% 48.02% 60.22% 57.58% 640
YOPO-5-3 86.43% 48.24% 47.74% 51.87% 59.78% 81.98% 335
ATTA-1 85.71% 50.96% 48.18% 52.31% 64.16% 76% 134
ATTA-2 85.95% 51.90% 49.45% 53.08% 64.42% 77.02% 196
ATTA-3 85.44% 52.56% 50.77% 53.92% 64.82% 75.92% 267
ATTA-10 83.80% 54.33% 52.6% 55.38% 63.49% 75.37% 690
TRADES
PGD-1 93.58% 35.52% 31.84% 38.42% 65.03% 86.46% 592
PGD-2 90.61% 49.75% 45.66% 51.19% 60.86% 85.48% 730
PGD-3 88.52% 54.20% 52.19% 55.91% 62.88% 84.48% 861
PGD-10 84.13% 56.6% 55.36% 57.76% 63.02% 79.4% 2028
ATTA-1 85.04% 54.50% 52.66% 55.70% 64.04% 82.62% 199
ATTA-2 84.58% 54.94% 53.27% 56.17% 63.72% 81.92% 261
ATTA-3 84.23% 56.36% 54.85% 57.24% 64.03% 81.82% 320
ATTA-10 83.67% 57.34% 56.39% 58.15% 64.1% 82.01% 752
Table 11: The result of various attacks on CIFAR10 dataset.
